

enough armored vehicles to provide an enhanced level of protection for their employees.¹⁰ Furthermore, OIG identified problems with the maintenance of armored vehicles, including inadequate tire pressure and extensive damage to windshields.¹¹ These deficiencies can directly affect the safety and utility of these vehicles.

Compounding those problems are deficiencies in driver training, an issue that OIG has previously identified.¹² For example, OIG found that most chauffeurs at Mission Pakistan lacked armored vehicle training even though the mission's own travel policy mandates the use of armored vehicles for all vehicle movements.¹³ OIG also reported instances where inadequate driver training extended beyond armored vehicle operators. In particular, several inspection reports discussed posts that did not ensure that all their chauffeurs and incidental drivers received appropriate training.¹⁴ Some posts also failed to ensure drivers had required medical certifications¹⁵ and adhered to Department limits on working hours.¹⁶ At Embassy Tel Aviv—a post with a high number of preventable vehicle mishaps—OIG also found that the embassy did not impose disciplinary measures on three drivers with repeated motor vehicle mishaps.¹⁷

Some of these issues are limited to practices at particular posts. More generally, though, OIG recommendations have identified potential improvements in program management practices that could minimize these deficiencies. For example, the Department should develop and implement a detailed plan for the armored vehicle program and hire an experienced

program manager to oversee the fleet. Regarding the acquisition and maintenance of armored vehicles, the Department should bolster its internal policies requiring adherence to its standards.¹⁸ Furthermore, given that Department personnel posted abroad rely heavily on official vehicles, posts should ensure that supervisors are not disregarding limits on working hours, overlooking requirements for medical certifications and driving training, or ignoring appropriate occasions to administer disciplinary measures.

Residential Security

In FY 2017, OIG identified some posts that largely complied with the Department's standards for residential safety and security. For example, a limited-scope inspection of Embassy Kingston in Jamaica revealed a housing pool that generally met Department standards.¹⁹ Additionally, OIG found that new employees received briefings that outlined the critical crime threat in Jamaica and policies and directives related to personnel security restrictions.²⁰

In many other posts, however, OIG continued to find deficiencies in the administration of the Department's housing and related anti-crime program. Multiple inspections identified posts that had not ensured that residential properties met the Department's fire safety standards.²¹ For example, in Luanda, Angola, OIG reported that 28 of the 38 government-leased apartments in a high-rise building did not meet fire safety requirements and concluded they should be removed from the housing pool.²² Additionally, OIG

¹⁰ OIG, *Audit of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Administration of the Armored Vehicle Program* (AUD-SI-17-21, February 2017).

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Armored Vehicle Training* (ISP-16-17, July 2016).

¹³ OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan* (ISP-I-17-11A, February 2017).

¹⁴ OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Tel Aviv, Israel* (ISP-I-17-20, May 2017); OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan* (ISP-I-17-13, March 2017); ISP-I-17-12, May 2017; ISP-I-17-16, May 2017.

¹⁵ ISP-I-17-20, May 2017; ISP-I-17-12, May 2017; ISP-I-17-16, May 2017.

¹⁶ ISP-I-17-20, May 2017; ISP-I-17-16, May 2017.

¹⁷ ISP-I-17-20, May 2017. OIG notes that, based on its recommendations to improve the motor vehicle safety management program and the Department's efforts, Embassy Tel Aviv has significantly decreased motor vehicle mishaps.

¹⁸ AUD-SI-17-21, February 2017.

¹⁹ OIG, *Inspection of Emergency Preparedness and Residential Security at Embassy Kingston, Jamaica* (ISP-I-17-25A, June 2017).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Belgrade, Serbia* (ISP-I-17-08A, January 2017); OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Luanda, Angola* (ISP-I-17-19, June 2017); ISP-I-17-12, May 2017.

²² ISP-I-17-19, June 2017.