U.S. Department of State Fiscal Year 2020 Agency Financial Report

contract management deficiencies and the significant financial cost to the Department to address the situation, we also noted that there were security implications. For example, as a result of the delays, embassy operations continued to be conducted from multiple locations and in facilities that did not meet the Department’s security requirements, including appropriate setback and standards for seismic activity. A major construction project in London illustrated this challenge as well. OIG found that inadequate attention to major systems design and local building requirements led to design flaws in a semicircular pond that serves partly as a security barrier. Additionally, defects related to security, fire safety, and elevators were noted by OBO after the facility had been declared substantially complete. 3 In 2004, OBO established a lessons learned program to update design criteria, guidance, and processes in support of the planning, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of OBO facilities overseas. However, a recent OIG report found that the current program does not capture broader best practices or lessons learned that are critical to OBO’s construction work, including strengthening collaboration among stakeholders, facilitating building maintenance, and improving program and construction management. These important activities have been overlooked in the lessons learned process because OBO has devoted attention and resources solely to collecting and addressing technical design challenges encountered during its construction projects. Additionally, in examining OBO’s internal reporting for construction projects in Amman, Kabul, Ashgabat, and London, OIG found errors and inconsistencies in 33 percent of 125 reports produced between 2013 and 2019 addressing those projects. 4 Beyond ensuring the initial construction of safe and secure facilities, the Department is also responsible for comprehensive preventative and routine maintenance of its existing facilities. 3 OIG, Management Assistance Report: Execution of the New Embassy Compound London Construction Project Offers Multiple Lessons (AUD-CGI-20-36, July 2020). 4 OIG, Audit of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations Process To Identify and Apply Best Practices and Lessons Learned to Future Construction Projects (AUD-MERO-20-39, September 2020). 5 OIG, Inspection of Embassy Maseru, Lesotho (ISP-I-20-01, October 2019). 6 OIG, Inspection of Embassy Stockholm, Sweden (ISP-I-20-06, December 2019). 7 OIG, Inspection of Embassy Yaoundé , Cameroon (ISP-I-20-20, May 2020); OIG, Inspection of Embassy Canberra and Constituent Posts, Australia (ISP-I-20-07, February 2020); OIG, Inspection of Embassy Pretoria and Constituent Posts, South Africa (ISP-I-20-09, January 2020); Inspection of Embassy N’Djamena, Chad (ISP-I-20-02, November 2019). Our FY 2020 inspection work continued to identify problems related to facilities maintenance at several overseas posts. For example, in Lesotho, two emergency exit doors in a building on the embassy compound lacked the required electrical locks with emergency override and panic devices. Without these safety devices, an alarm does not sound if the doors are opened, and embassy security is not notified if there is an emergency. 5 Ensuring the Health and Safety of Personnel Abroad Our inspection work consistently finds that embassy leadership is engaged on health and safety issues. The Department frequently takes action to address these challenges when identified. For example, in Sweden, embassy staff identified a life safety issue with a large purchase of lamps. Proactive efforts by the embassy resulted in a worldwide safety alert and the vendor’s replacement of the lamps at no additional cost. 6 Nonetheless, we also continue to identify instances where a lack of management oversight and failure to follow Department standards create risks for Department personnel and their families. As in previous years, we note the following three areas for improvement: residential security, operation of official vehicles, and emergency preparedness. Residential Security Our inspection report findings show that many Department employees and their families continue to occupy residences abroad that do not or cannot be demonstrated to meet Department safety standards. 7 To take one example, in Cameroon, OIG found the Post Occupational Safety and Health Officer (POSHO) did not enter into the appropriate system certifications for 41 residential properties listed in the real property database, making it impossible to determine whether residences met standards. In addition, half of the 10 property lease files OIG reviewed lacked POSHO certifications, 118 | U ni ted S tates D epartment of S tate 2020 A gency F inanci al R eport OTHER INFORMATION | INSPECTOR GENERAL’S STATEMENT ON THE DEPARTMENT’S MAJOR MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES