U.S. Department of State Fiscal Year 2020 Agency Financial Report

Department faces a much more specific challenge in managing contracts and foreign assistance programs in these locations. A recent study on rightsizing found that staffing reviews in Afghanistan and Iraq were conducted in an expedited manner because the missions were directed to immediately reduce staff. However, the foreign policy priorities and strategic diplomatic objectives for each mission were not changed to reflect staffing adjustments. For example, preventing the recurrence of a terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan and countering malign influence in Iraq remained stated policy objectives even though personnel who advanced these objectives were significantly reduced. Just as the short time frame and limited resources affected staffing decisions overall, these same factors precluded either mission from fully assessing and adjusting its strategic objectives to align with the staff reductions prescribed. 54 Contracts and other foreign assistance in contingency environments can also be susceptible to less oversight, as identified in several reports. 55 For example, a recent report noted that AF was not ensuring that the assistance provided to certain host countries was being used to build counterterrorism capacity. AF officials stated that the absence of clear guidance and limited staff to oversee the contracts contributed to these weaknesses. Because of these weaknesses, OIG reported $201.6 million spent on six contracts as potential wasteful spending due to mismanagement and inadequate oversight. 56 In Somalia, OIG noted that oversight officials did not designate four foreign assistance awards as high risk even though they were implemented in a country where travel is restricted due to political instability and terrorism. When risk assessments are not accurate and kept current, bureaus operating in high- threat environments may not fully develop mitigation plans tailored to address foreseeable risks that may impede program implementation. 57 54 OIG, Audit of the Department of State’s Approach To Adjust the Size and Composition of U.S. Missions Afghanistan and Iraq (AUD-MERO-20-38, August 2020). 55 AUD-MERO-20-45, September 2020; AUD-MERO-20-42, September 2020; AUD-MERO-20-38, August 2020; ISP-I-20-14, June 2020; ISP-C-20-23, May 2020; AUD-MERO-20-29, April 2020. 56 AUD-MERO-20-42, September 2020. 57 AUD-MERO-20-45, September 2020. 58 OIG, Review of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program (AUD-MERO-20-35, June 2020). 59 OIG, Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance Explosive Detection Canine Program – Health and Welfare (ESP-19-06, September 2019). 60 OIG, Management Assistance Report: Continued Health and Welfare Concerns for Antiterrorism Assistance Explosive Detection Canines (ESP-20-02, December 2019). Also, a review of the Afghan special immigrant visa (SIV) program revealed that the lack of a centralized database contributed to delays in processing visa applicants, and weaknesses in current practices for verifying Afghan SIV applicants increase the Department’s risk for fraud and threats to national security. 58 OIG found that outside the workplace, U.S. Government protection for SIV applicants did not extend beyond the specific terms of their employment. We recommended the Department examine whether and how protection could be provided for those SIV applicants experiencing “imminent danger” as they await processing of their applications for immigration to the United States. Finally, the Department continues to experience health and welfare concerns for antiterrorism assistance explosive detection canines that were first raised in a September 2019 report. 59 An FY 2020 report confirmed that additional canines beyond those described in the initial evaluation had died from non-natural (that is, preventable) causes in Jordan in 2019 after OIG concluded its fieldwork. The death of two canines from non-natural causes—namely, hyperthermia and poisoning— since June 2019 raises serious questions about the Department’s contention that it has taken adequate steps to protect their health and safety. OIG is particularly concerned that the deaths of the two additional Jordanian dogs occurred while four Department-funded personnel were in-country to monitor the care of the dogs. 60 6 W orkforce M anagement The Bureau of Global Talent Management identifies people as the Department’s greatest asset. The Department accordingly expends substantial resources on recruiting, training, and retaining a diverse, talented workforce capable of carrying out the Department’s foreign policy goals and priorities. However, OIG’s work finds that staffing gaps, frequent turnover, 126 | U ni ted S tates D epartment of S tate 2020 A gency F inanci al R eport OTHER INFORMATION | INSPECTOR GENERAL’S STATEMENT ON THE DEPARTMENT’S MAJOR MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES